A Language-Matching Model to Improve Equity and Efficiency of COVID-19 Contact Tracing
Lisa Lu, Benjamin Anderson, Raymond Ha, Alexis D’Agostino, Sarah L. Rudman, Derek Ouyang, and Daniel E. Ho
PNAS, October 2021
Evaluation of Allocation Schemes of COVID-19 Testing Resources in a Community-Based Door-to-Door Testing Program
Ben Chugg, Lisa Lu, Derek Ouyang, Benjamin Anderson, Raymond Ha, Alexis D’Agostino, Anandi Sujeer, Sarah L. Rudman, Analilia Garcia, Daniel E. Ho,
JAMA Health Forum, August 2021
[PDF] [Journal Link]
I am currently an Empirical Research Fellow at the Regulation, Evaluation, and Governance Lab at Stanford, supervised by Professor Daniel Ho. I began working with the lab as a part-time research assistant in September 2020, and joined full-time in July 2021. I am currently working on a team engaged in joint projects with Santa Clara County to improve COVID-19 case investigation and contact tracing.
Our projects have included a door-to-door contact tracing intervention and a language specialty team intervention, both aimed at improving outreach to Spanish-speaking residents. I designed and implemented an offline address cleaning and geocoding algorithm used in both of these interventions. I also implemented the Bayesian Improved First Name Surname Geocoding method to impute missing race/ethnicity information, and used it to analyze racial/ethnic disparities in COVID-19 outreach. My current project involves marrying genomic sequencing data with contact tracing information to model the COVID-19 transmission network, in order to programatically flag important cases for further investigation.
I wrote my senior thesis as the culmination of my program in Honors in Ethics in Society at Stanford. My thesis analyzes theories of wrongful discrimination, and explores how they might be applied to the problem of racial preferences in romantic and sexual relationships. I lay out the ethical problems associated with racial preferences, and survey the existing social science research. I introduce two philosophical accounts of what makes discrimination wrong—one based on demeaning, and another based on harm. I consider what resources these theories of discrimination can provide in service of an argument about the moral status of racial preferences. Finally, I consider the limitations of viewing racial preferences through the lens of discrimination. I conclude that racial preferences must be understood not just as a problem with individuals (which might be addressed through critical self-reflection), but as a structural problem, something which falls out of the way society is organized, and the way its rules, norms, and institutions shape our lives.